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Delegated by default? Privately owned technology in the family justice system – opportunities and challenges for access to justice

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Summary

This report traces the shift from an emphasis on publicly owned and built court technology towards a 'delegated by default' model where tools developed and managed by the private sector increasingly mediate access to, and support the operation of, the courts. It examines the risks created by this new approach, focusing on those that are particularly acute for family justice, before recommending urgent reforms to regulation and governance to protect consumers and access to justice.

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Executive Summary

Background

Government and the court service are increasingly delegating the delivery of digital and AI-mediated justice services to private providers – incentivising the market to connect digital legal information and advice and dispute resolution tools to the courts, procuring privately built systems for justice agencies, and layering justice-specific interfaces on top of proprietary AI models. This increasing reliance on technology that is built, owned and managed by the private sector represents a significant departure from previous approaches to digitising the justice system, which championed publicly built, publicly owned technology as an active design choice. Further, this shift in approach is properly understood as one of '*delegation by default*' rather than *design*, catalysed by fiscal constraints, the underperformance of the £1 billion His Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) digital court reform programme, and rapid developments in technology, specifically generative AI (GenAI). Regulation and governance have failed to keep pace with this shift in approach, resulting in a patchwork of protections that are wholly inadequate to protect litigants or the justice system.

Findings

In family justice, this approach creates risks that are notably acute due to both the nature of disputes and the vulnerability of the parties. Pre-court, the standalone provision of online or AI-assisted legal information and advice falls outside legal services regulation; it is not a reserved activity under the Legal Services Act 2007, and the Act only regulates authorised persons. As a consequence, litigants using general-purpose GenAI tools[1] (e.g. ChatGPT) to access legal information or prepare court documents are exposed to risk for which there is currently no redress. Government has repeatedly been forced to step in to correct market failure in online information and advice for separating families, and the market has similarly struggled to deliver sustainable, high-quality pre-court dispute resolution: of the eight companies listed on the LawtechUK tracker as providing family law services, only three plausibly offer

[1] In this report, 'GenAI tools' refers to general-purpose, publicly available generative AI tools such as ChatGPT and Claude, which use large language models to generate text and other content in response to a user's prompt, and which are not designed, marketed or trained for a specific legal or judicial use case. This is distinct from bespoke consumer-facing legal AI tools.

dispute resolution, none is subject to legal services regulation, and one has already prompted a Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) investigation following concerns that it was misleading consumers.

Where high-quality provision exists, the growing use of general-purpose GenAI tools for search risks displacing it, disrupting decades of investment aimed at improving access to authoritative, accessible online provision. In family justice as elsewhere, there is emerging evidence that litigants are turning to these tools directly for advice and document preparation, despite the fact that GenAI tools frequently get the law wrong. Several features of GenAI tools create risks that are especially serious in the context of family disputes – which are relational and emotionally driven. GenAI tools are prone to sycophancy, affirming users in their beliefs even where they are incorrect – research demonstrates that using these tools even once can distort social judgment and discourage behavioural repair. Accordingly, the use of these tools risks transforming good-faith litigants into intransigent ones, undermining ongoing attempts by policymakers and professionals to de-escalate conflict and divert parties towards conciliation. This propensity may also affirm vexatious litigants and domestic abusers, while simultaneously enabling them to produce superficially convincing court documents at scale, weaponising litigation and overwhelming the already overburdened courts.

Within court, judges have been issued with a secure version of Microsoft Copilot, with use cases to October 2026 emerging piecemeal through guidance, policy documents and judicial speeches rather than through a published process. There is little public detail on how it was determined that judges can use Copilot safely, or for which tasks. This is despite the fact that Microsoft's own Application Card for the product, published to help customers understand its limitations, advises against using the system in ways that could affect an individual's legal status or rights. General-purpose large language models (LLMs) used for summarisation and editing are prone to inaccuracy, hallucination and subtle shifts in meaning, including the flattening of 'justified asymmetry' that risks compounding courts' documented tendency to reframe domestic abuse allegations as mutual conflict. Existing safeguards rely on judicial users of the technology as a 'human in the loop', but behavioural research shows this safeguard is unreliable in practice: the superficial fluency of AI outputs makes users less likely to scrutinise them even under incentives to check. No published information shows that judicial Copilot use is being monitored for guidance compliance, there currently is no requirement for judges to disclose its use, the findings of pilots have not been published and promised approaches to support litigants to contest judicial use of AI have not materialised. Existing frameworks of principles from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), HMCTS and the Judicial Working Group and most recently the judiciary's own position statement do not reconcile with each other. Compared with healthcare and financial services, the regulatory response to these risks lacks urgency.

Conclusion

Nothing in this report should be read as an argument against digital or AI-mediated justice, or against a role for the private sector in delivering it. It is an argument that the current model, delegation by default, is a policy choice rather than a neutral consequence of technological change, and that it can and should be replaced by a deliberate approach: publicly funded and governed standards for safety, performance and evidence, matched to proportionate but effective oversight and accessible redress, within which a competitive market can safely operate. Above all, this is an argument against inertia. If government fails to act now, it will not simply forgo the benefits AI and digital technology could bring to access to justice; it risks generating new and avoidable costs, undermining already fragile public trust in the justice system, and compounding the very problems that the shift to digital justice was meant to solve.

Recommendations

The report makes 26 recommendations under four themes, reproduced in full below. Firstly, the MoJ should act urgently to close two distinct regulatory gaps that leave *AI tools performing legal-advice functions* outside regulation.

For general-purpose tools such as ChatGPT and Claude, developed by providers based outside England and Wales, the MoJ should work with the departments and regulators responsible for health and financial services, who face analogous challenges, to consult on new approaches to regulation. Regulation should be triggered by what a tool does, rather than relying on provider declared intended purpose – closing existing loopholes that enable companies to use product framing and disclaimers to avoid regulation. It should also apply regardless of where the provider is based and ensure consumers can access redress. The UK should use its 2027 G20 presidency to seek international agreement on these protections, learning lessons from the "underwhelming" impact[2] of the Online Safety Act 2023.

For domestic tools provided by unauthorised persons that produce legal advice or assistance: "in connection with the application of the law or with any form of resolution of legal disputes"[3], the MoJ should, as an interim measure, develop a mandatory public register of unauthorised providers, as recommended by the Competition and Markets Authority, giving consumers access to redress and generating evidence about the nature and scale of any detriment arising from the use of these tools. Providers whose tools give users personalised advice on their own legal situation should be required to

[2] House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee (2026) Uncorrected oral evidence: The Online Safety Act: implementation and impact, 15 September 2026, Q24. https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/18091/pdf/

[3] Legal Services Act 2007, s12(3)(b)(i). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/section/12

register and secure risk-based financial protection, even if their terms describe that output as general legal information. The wider review of legal services regulation recommended by the independent review of the Legal Services Board[4] should build on this register. The MoJ should also create a National Commission on the Regulation of AI in Justice, following the example set by health.

Secondly, the MoJ should address market failure in consumer-facing tools: developing a government response to the impact of Google's AI Overview on access to high-quality legal information, committing to long-term investment in trusted public information and advice tools, publishing evaluations of earlier government-backed tools, and developing and publishing quality standards for the existing services and tools listed by LawtechUK. The MoJ should also create an ongoing mechanism for monitoring how litigants in person use GenAI tools, and the impact of this use on dispute resolution strategy.

Thirdly, the MoJ should urgently act to build the assurance, evaluation and transparency infrastructure that does not exist. As a matter of urgency, the MoJ, HMCTS and the judiciary should *publish their evidence base for disregarding Microsoft's own advice against using Copilot where it could affect legal status or rights*. The judicial AI steering committee should also publish the list of approved AI tools and the findings of completed pilots. Future use cases, benchmarks and assurance frameworks should be consulted upon prior to deployment. Judicial independence should be protected through developing the centralised steering group, chaired by the Lead AI Judge into a sustainably funded Judicial AI Oversight Committee, answerable to the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor and responsible for commissioning independent evaluation of judicial AI tools This Committee would provide the senior judiciary with the evidence needed to support safe adoption without compromising constitutional norms. The MoJ should also assess vendor lock-in and sovereignty risk created by the existing approach to procurement.

Fourthly, the MoJ, HMCTS and the judiciary must strengthen the governance of AI use in courts to ensure that both litigants and the system are protected. The MoJ's existing AI Action Plan should be reconciled with the HMCTS and Judicial AI Working Group's principles and the Position Statement on the Judicial use of artificial intelligence so that AI use is governed by a coherent rather than competing framework. HMCTS should not connect any private or third-sector tools to the courts without published quality standards – which should be developed with stakeholders through a process funded by the MoJ – and identifying a specified regulator to provide monitoring and enforcement. The MoJ should ensure that justice- and court-specific AI standards are developed in consultation with stakeholders and written into procurement contracts rather than deferring to commercial vendors' own terms. Once tools are in use, the Lady Chief Justice should require judges to document and disclose that use. The Lord Chancellor

[4] Lloyd, R. (2026). The Legal Services Board: independent public bodies review. Ministry of Justice. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-legal-services-board-independent-public-bodies-review

and the Lady Chief Justice should consult publicly on proposals to ensure that litigants in person, not only lawyers, are able to contest the use of AI in their case. Finally, the MoJ, HMCTS and the judiciary should agree an approach to ongoing monitoring of GenAI's impact on court capacity, rates of legal representation, case outcomes, and public trust and confidence, starting in the family courts, to ensure that an evidence base exists to manage demand and address weaponised or vexatious litigation.

Recommendations

1. Close the regulatory gap

1.1 **The Ministry of Justice should work with the departments and regulators responsible for health and financial services to consult on new approaches to regulating general-purpose AI tools that provide legal, health and financial advice,** using the UK's 2027 G20 presidency as a vehicle to seek international agreement. At a minimum, any approach should reach providers wherever they are based; determine whether a tool is in scope by what it does, not how it is framed or disclaimed; require risk-based financial protection; and ensure consumers can access effective redress.

1.2 **The Ministry of Justice should, as an interim measure and without waiting for the review of the Legal Services Act 2007, develop a mandatory public register of unauthorised providers of legal services, as recommended by the Competition and Markets Authority**[5]**.** As a condition of registration, providers should be required to offer consumers access to mechanisms for complaints and redress and hold risk based financial protection proportionate to the services they provide. The MoJ should review the options for delivering redress, including extending the remit of the Legal Ombudsman or mandating alternative dispute resolution. The MoJ should explore options for funding the register, which could include a registration fee paid by registrants and case fees for redress. The legislation establishing the register should allow further requirements, including quality and evidence standards to be added as they are developed with funding from the MoJ.

1.3 **The MoJ should ensure that the wider review of legal services regulation recommended by Lloyd**[6] **builds on the register in recommendation 1.2 rather than delaying it.** The review of legal services regulation should consider how domestic AI-facilitated legal advice tools can be regulated through registration rather than by making legal advice a reserved activity. It should determine how requirements for risk-based financial protection should apply (including exploring alternatives to insurance) and consider how not-for-profit providers can be supported to meet evidence standards for AI tools. It should also reshape the reserved activities around risk and explore options for consolidating the regulatory and complaints landscape[7] to make it easier for consumers to navigate. The regulation of mediation should also be

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[5] Competition and Markets Authority (2020). Review of the legal services market study in England and Wales. UK government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fd9e53cd3bf7f40ccb335e1/Legal_Services_Review_-_Final_report.pdf

[6] Lloyd, R. (2026). The Legal Services Board: independent public bodies review. Ministry of Justice. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-legal-services-board-independent-public-bodies-review

[7] Legal Services Consumer Panel (2026). A regulatory framework for the future [Position paper]. https://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/LSCP-Position-Paper-final.pdf

considered through this review. In the interim, the Legal Services Board should include AI legal advice, including from general-purpose tools, in the first annual assessment of sector risk recommended by the independent review[8].

1.4 **The MoJ should create and resource a National Commission into the Regulation of AI in Justice** modelled on the National Commission for the Regulation of AI in Health. The commission's terms of reference should include: i.) identifying gaps in and recommending reforms to the existing regulatory and governance infrastructure – including the Legal Services Act 2007, the Online Procedure Rule Committee, the MoJ AI Action Plan principles and the HMCTS and Judicial Working Group for AI principles among others; ii.) considering whether new bodies – for example, a NICE equivalent for justice – may be required, to ensure that AI tools deliver in terms of cost effectiveness; iii.) reviewing findings from the AI Growth Lab sandbox, which should be adapted to explicitly consider what new consumer protection standards may be required; iv.) identifying a body who might be tasked with developing use cases, quality standards, deployment standards, evidence standards, procurement standards and approaches to post market surveillance for technology, including AI tools aimed at improving efficiency; drawing on emerging good practice from other sectors and standards bodies; v.) suggesting new mechanisms for consumer redress; The National Commission should be supported by a funded research partner, to deliver a programme of work which should include i.) public polling and public deliberation, ii.) engagement with underrepresented stakeholders and impacted communities, iii.) stakeholder workshops, and iv.) a public call for evidence.

2. Fix the market failure in consumer-facing tools

2.1 **The MoJ should learn from initiatives that are being developed across sectors to address the impact of Google's AI Overview on access to high-quality sources of legal information and advice.** Following this review, they should urgently develop and publish their own approach.

2.2 **The MoJ should build or commission trusted, publicly funded advice tools** – hosted on or signposted from GOV.UK, continuing the MoJ/Accelerated Capability Environment (ACE) work, with long-term funding rather than pilot-and-discontinue cycles. The MoJ should consult with the FCA, who are considering a range of approaches to delivering and resourcing a trusted public-interest AI enabled financial capability service.

2.3 **HMCTS and the MoJ should publish evaluations of previous and existing government-backed tools** – to ensure that new tools do not replicate previous issues.

[8] Lloyd, R. (2026). The Legal Services Board: independent public bodies review. Ministry of Justice. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-legal-services-board-independent-public-bodies-review

2.4 **The HMCTS and the MoJ should design future reforms around vulnerable users** – litigants in person facing deprivation, domestic abuse, mental ill-health, low literacy, substance misuse or language barriers – digital self-service tools should not be assumed to meet their needs. Where digital self-service tools are contemplated, the MoJ and HMCTS should require that the business case is evidence based. Considering that that the rationale for investing in digital self-service tools rests on an assumption that the adoption of these tools will free up in-person resource and capacity for vulnerable litigants, this should be modelled using data about the existing system's actual user base. Without this, there is a risk that the proportion of litigants able to self-serve digitally may be smaller than assumed, meaning too few are diverted to meaningfully free up resources and physical capacity.

2.5 **The MoJ should create a monitoring mechanism to generate longitudinal evidence on how litigants in person actually use general-purpose GenAI –** quantitative research to establish prevalence and use over time, and to test the performance of models in terms of their ability to deliver information that is accurate and fair; and qualitative research to explore whether GenAI's features can address the structural problems with online legal information and the impact of GenAI use on litigant behaviour and dispute resolution strategy. As a first step, the MoJ should commission researchers to review the range of available methodologies and data sources that could be used to deliver this mechanism, and recommend options.

2.6 **The MoJ should require LawtechUK to review the list of companies published on the LawtechUK tracker and include quality and evidence standards for those that are listed –** at present the tracker does not apply any quality filter – it presently lists a firm whose practices previously triggered a CMA inquiry into misleading consumers. The tracker should be developed to list information regarding intended purpose, target population, accuracy, evidence of efficacy, and conformity to existing data protection, privacy and accessibility standards (mirroring the information provided for digital health tools by ORCHA).

3. Build assurance, evaluation and transparency

3.1 **The MoJ, HMCTS and the judiciary must immediately publish their evidence base for disregarding Microsoft's own advice against using Copilot where it could affect legal status or rights.** The judiciary should publish the list of approved AI tools, summaries of pilot evaluations, and the steering group's decisions on new use cases, consistent with their commitment to transparency and open justice.

3.2 **The Lady Chief Justice should immediately commission independent research to evaluate the performance of Copilot and comparable tools for judicial use cases in context before further rollout** – assessing the impact on accuracy, bias, semantic drift, procedural justice, case outcomes, judicial workload and public trust. This research should be funded by the MoJ.

3.3 **The Lady Chief Justice should commission research to test whether existing 'human in the loop' safeguards hold under real time and other pressures** – and separately monitor the impact on judicial well-being of relying on individual judges as the primary safeguard. This work should be commissioned to an independent research organisation or organisations, and funded by the MoJ.

3.4 **The Lady Chief Justice should review and publish officially approved prompt templates in judicial training materials** – to ensure that prompt templates provided to the judiciary do not risk crossing into 'legal analysis' – a use case that existing judicial guidance does not recommend.

3.5 **The Lady Chief Justice should develop the centralised steering group announced in the Position Statement on the Judicial use of Artificial Intelligence into a Judicial AI Oversight Committee to oversee judicial use of AI and commission independent research into its impact.** Anonymised data on judicial use of AI tools, including Microsoft Copilot, should be provided to this committee for the purpose of understanding trends in adoption and use and ensuring that judicial guidance is complied with. The committee should be answerable to and report directly to both the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. The MoJ must ensure that the committee is sustainably funded with a budget of no less than £1 million per annum (benchmarked against the budget provided for the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, who has been tasked with developing a reporting mechanism to review the treatment of allegations of domestic abuse in private family law cases) and staffed with an expert secretariat to support the commissioning of independent, robust research and evaluation. The Committee should also contribute findings to an AI Incident Database, published by HMCTS, that records malfunctions, outages, errors and bias events.

3.6 **The MoJ should co-develop context-specific benchmarks and success and harm measures with affected families and court users** – consulting on the evaluation approach itself with technical experts and wider stakeholders. In particular, the MoJ should invest in socio-technical evaluation – evaluation that considers the performance of each technology within its system, and explores how that performance is mediated by processes and people. The MoJ should commit to publishing the findings of these evaluations as standard practice. Success criteria should be expanded beyond adoption and cost effectiveness. In addition, any analysis of cost effectiveness and value for money should be extended to model the impact of AI tools across the justice system, not just the individual agency deploying the tool.

3.7 **The MoJ should create and consult on a justice-specific AI assurance framework** – In developing this framework, the MoJ should commission a review of existing initiatives across government, with a view to developing/extending existing resources. At a minimum, this framework should cover pre-deployment safety assessment, procurement assurance, evidence standards, post-deployment monitoring and clear responsibility for failures. The standards for AI tools used across the family justice system should be determined through system-wide discussions, coordinated by the Family Justice Board, and including the perspectives of the judiciary, social workers, people affected by care processes and regulators who establish standards for professionals, including lawyers and social workers. Once developed, the performance of the framework should be assessed on an ongoing basis. Standards for AI tools used

by judges fall outside this framework's remit; these are addressed separately below, to ensure the executive does not unilaterally determine the adequacy bar for tools that affect judicial decision-making.

3.8 **Assurance standards for AI tools used by judges and court staff should be set jointly by the MoJ and the Lady Chief Justice, and overseen by the Judicial AI Oversight Committee** – rather than by the MoJ alone. This should cover the same minimum elements as the MoJ's wider assurance framework (pre-deployment safety assessment, evidence standards, post-deployment monitoring and clear responsibility for failures), applied specifically to judicial-use tools such as Copilot. The Committee should be empowered to require evidence that a given tool meets this bar before further rollout is approved.

3.9 **The MoJ and HMCTS should assess vendor lock-in and sovereignty risk before further embedding proprietary AI** – The MoJ should reduce dependence on a small number of foreign AI developers. It should also adopt AI more selectively, favouring open and interoperable infrastructure. Where frontier capability is genuinely needed, the MoJ should attach firmer conditions to access, including interoperability standards, guaranteed retention of IP and data generated, and preferential long-term access terms. More widely, the UK government should scale up in-house capability such as i.AI to avoid public sector lock-in. A What Works Centre for AI in Public Services, as proposed by the Ada Lovelace Institute[9], could support smarter adoption and procurement, and enable government departments, including the MoJ, to extract fairer value from public sector AI partnerships.

4. Govern AI use in court and protect users

4.1 **HMCTS should not connect private or third-sector tools to the courts without published quality standards, monitoring and enforcement** – The MoJ should work with stakeholders, regulators and standards bodies to develop quality standards for private and third-sector online information, advice and dispute resolution tools. (see recommendation 1.2 above). Existing tools should not be connected to the courts without meeting these quality standards, and without ongoing monitoring and enforcement by a specified regulator once connected. As with Open Banking, once developed, these standards and arrangements should be enshrined in legislation that specifies i.) what data must be shared and ii.) a named regulator responsible for guarding against misuse of the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) connecting providers to the courts – neither currently exists.

4.2 **The MoJ, HMCTS and the judiciary should agree an approach to ongoing monitoring of the impact of the use of GenAI tools on court capacity, rates of legal representation, the characteristics of litigants in person, case outcomes, and public trust and confidence in the courts.** As a first step, HMCTS should commission a review of international approaches to measuring the impact of GenAI tools on the courts – with a view to identifying and implementing any changes to the way in which data held in

[9] Parker, I., and Carter, L. (2025). *Licence to build: Public attitudes to public sector AI*. Ada Lovelace Institute. https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/licence-to-build/

court files is collected, stored and shared that may be needed to support this monitoring. The approach proposed should be consulted upon with academic experts, stakeholders, user representatives and users of the justice system, focusing on people with experience of representing themselves in proceedings. The family courts should be prioritised in this exercise, with immediate attention given to the need to identify robust methods for identifying the impact of GenAI tools on vexatious or weaponised litigation. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner should be engaged in these discussions at the earliest possible stage.

4.3 **The Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice should reconcile the MoJ AI Action Plan with the HMCTS/Judicial AI Working Group principles – and the Position Statement on the Judicial Use of Artificial Intelligence**—the HMCTS/Judicial AI Working Group's 'reliable' and 'contestable' principles are absent from the former; and the role of HMCTS and the Judicial Office in specifying evaluation standards is not explained. One set of principles should be produced and published jointly by the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice.

4.4 **The MoJ should meaningfully consult on AI use cases in court with stakeholders, court users and the public** – Existing and proposed applications should be put out for consultation before approval, not evaluated only after adoption. The MoJ should follow the example of the Home Office, who have invested in public deliberation exercises to test use cases for AI in policing[10]. These findings should be shared with the judiciary, to support the development of guidance.

4.5 **The Lady Chief Justice should issue guidance requiring documentation and disclosure of judicial AI use , drawing on emerging international practice.** Wherever AI is used to summarise evidence, or draft, edit or anonymise judgments, this should be made explicit in the file. The guidance should require judges to produce an adjunct memorandum as an annexe stating the name of the tool used, model and provider company; the date on which it was used; and that they read, understood and accepted the terms and conditions of use. The memorandum should also explain what the tool was used for and the details of how it was used and include the specific prompts or instructions used. In the memorandum, the judge should also account for the ways in which their reasoning engaged with or diverged from the outputs of the tool. Within any documents produced using the tool, judges should follow UNESCO guidance and refer to the specific location of the products or results reproduced, transcribed or incorporated, with inverted commas, bold, italics or any other method to clearly distinguish the texts that were produced by the tool (UNESCO 2025). This memorandum should be proactively shared with parties and their representatives to support contestability.

[10] Thinks Insight and Strategy (2025, May). *A public dialogue on artificial intelligence in policing: summary report*. Report commissioned by the Home Office. Sciencewise. https://sciencewise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/HO-CoLab-AI-in-Policing-report-summary.pdf

4.6 **The Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice should consult publicly on proposals for operationalising the contestability principle in the HMCTS/Judicial AI Working Group principles.** In devising an approach to contestability, priority should be given to designing a mechanism that enables litigants in person – not only lawyers, who are better equipped to spot AI-related issues – to contest the use of AI in their case. Amendments to the guidance published by the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office could be considered as part of this approach.

4.7 **The MoJ should require justice- or court-specific AI standards to be written into procurement contracts** – rather than deferring to the supplier's own commercial terms and publish contracts for centrally procured AI infrastructure.

Nuffield Family Justice Observatory

Nuffield Family Justice Observatory (Nuffield FJO) turns research, collaboration and new ideas into better experiences for children and families in the family justice system in England and Wales.

Nuffield FJO was established by the Nuffield Foundation, an independent charitable trust with a mission to advance social well-being. It funds and undertakes rigorous research, encourages innovation, and supports the use of sound evidence to inform social and economic policy and improve people's lives. The Nuffield Foundation is also the founder and co-funder of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the Ada Lovelace Institute.

We are always keen to expand our network of partners and would invite anyone who is interested in improving the lives of children and families in the family justice system to get in touch.

For further information or to get involved:

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